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ABSTRACT 
Non-Partisan ‘Get-Out-the-Vote’ Efforts and Policy Outcomes    
by Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson * 
This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention 
to analyze the impact of nonpartisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts on policy 
outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they 
provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we 
find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an 
important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In 
equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments 
of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by 
the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts 
arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the 
voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment’s size. 
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1 Introduction
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 not only establishes guidelines for governmen-
tal agencies, but also speciﬁcally encourages nongovernmental entities to take an active role
in voter registration. There is a myriad of nonproﬁt organizations — such as the Associa-
tion of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), Declare Yourself, the League
of Women Voters, and Rock the Vote to name a few — actively engaged in this eﬀort.
However, the tax-exempt status of these nonproﬁt organizations requires that any get-out-
the-vote eﬀorts (henceforth, gotv) be nonpartisan. A natural question that arises is: how do
nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts inﬂuence policy outcomes?
Although there is extensive research on the eﬀectiveness of the various gotv methods,1 the
theoretical research on how nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts inﬂuence policy outcomes is scant.2 This
is especially true when contrasted to the voluminous research on related political inﬂuence
activities such as lobbying. One reason for this neglect may be the fact that nonpartisan gotv
eﬀorts often claim lofty goals such as promoting democracy.3 However, the most engaged
nonproﬁt organizations are inherently political and are typically attached to a particular
segment of the electorate. And, in contrast to encouraging broad participation in govern-
ment, nonpartisan groups may legally target their gotv eﬀorts in a way that promotes their
political objectives.4
To examine how targeted nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts inﬂuence policy outcomes we utilize
1See Green and Gerber (2008) for a survey of this research.
2An exception to this is in the sociology literature following Marwell (2004), which considers the role of
nonproﬁt organizations in machine politics.
3This may also partly be due to the fact that in the two-party Hotelling-Downs model voter abstention
[as ﬁrst discussed by Downs 1957 (who uses the term ‘rational’ non-voting) and by Converse 1966 (who
uses the term ‘dynamic’ non-voting)] does not alter the policy choices of oﬃce-seeking candidates. See for
example Hinich and Ordeshook (1969), Ledyard (1984), and Riker and Ordeshook (1973).
4According to IRS rules for 501(c)(3)s, nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts may be targeted at groups that are either
under represented or that broadly share a set of common interests. For further details see the April 17, 2008
IRS memo which describes the Political Activities Compliance Initiative for the 2008 political campaign
season (available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2008 paci program letter.pdf).
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a three-period model of redistributive politics with segmented voters.5 The electorate con-
sists of a ﬁnite number of disjoint segments, which may diﬀer in size. In each segment an
exogenously speciﬁed portion (possibly zero) of the citizens abstains from voting, and the
abstention rates (or conversely, voter turnout rates) may vary across segments. Each voter
prefers higher to lower transfers, and each segment has a nonproﬁt advocacy organization
that represents its interests. In period one, each nonproﬁt may increase the voter turnout
rate in its segment by investing in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts that target the citizens in its seg-
ment. In period two, the two expected vote-share maximizing political parties observe the
segments’ updated turnout rates, and announce budget-balanced redistributive schedules,
which consist of an intra-segment homogeneous transfer level for each segment.6 In period
three, each of the voters votes for the party that oﬀers the higher transfer.
In equilibrium, only a subset of the nonproﬁt organizations engage in nonpartisan gotv
eﬀorts with the gotv eﬀorts occurring only in those segments of the electorate which are
suﬃciently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante abstention rate). In the
segments in which nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts arise, the change in the voter turnout rate, as
a result of the equilibrium nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts, is increasing in the segment’s level of
disenfranchisement and is decreasing in the segment’s size. The increases in the voter turnout
rates in the smaller more disenfranchised segments lead the parties to place relatively greater
weight on those segments, which results in higher equilibrium expected transfers to those
segments. Conversely, the segments that are larger and more civically engaged (i.e., have
lower ex ante abstention rates) receive lower expected transfers.
5Our model builds on the redistributive politics literature with segmented voters. See for example Cox
and McCubbins (1986), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996), Laslier (2002),
Stro¨mberg (2004), Schultz (2007), Kovenock and Roberson (2008, 2009), and Roberson (2008) among others.
6This may, alternatively, be interpreted as a level of local public good provision under the following
assumptions: (1) each citizen has the same preferences for local public good provision, (2) these preferences
are linear with respect to the level of local public good provision, (3) there are constant returns to the
production of the local public goods, and (4) there are no externalities or spillovers from local public good
provision.
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The intuition for the equilibrium pattern of nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts and the resulting
impact on policy outcomes follows from the interaction of size and disenfranchisement eﬀects.
The nonproﬁt advocacy organizations optimally engage in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts in order
to maximize their respective segment’s equilibrium expected transfer — which is strictly
increasing in the segment’s turnout rate — net of the cost of their nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts.
Since each segment’s equilibrium expected transfer depends on the segment’s turnout rate,
the nonproﬁt advocacy groups in the smaller segments have a size advantage. To increase a
segment’s turnout rate by any given percentage the number of initially non-voting citizens
who must become voting citizens and, hence, the cost of the nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts needed
to induce this change, is increasing in the size of the segment. For example consider two
segments (A and B), each with a turnout rate of 50%, but in segment A there are 4 citizens (2
voters and 2 non-voters) while in segment B there are 8 citizens (4 voters and 4 non-voters).
In order to increase the turnout rate to 75%, segment A needs only one non-voting citizen to
become a voter, but segment B needs two additional voters. To summarize, the smaller the
segment the larger the marginal eﬀect that each initially non-voting citizen who, through
nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts, switches and becomes a voting citizen has on the turnout rate.
In addition to the size eﬀect, in the more disenfranchised segments increasing the turnout
rate by any given percentage requires that a lower proportion of initially non-voting citizens
become voters as a result of the nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts. If the marginal return to nonpar-
tisan gotv eﬀorts is increasing with respect to the proportion of non-voting citizens, then
the nonproﬁt advocacy groups also encounter a voter disenfranchisement eﬀect. Combining
the size and disenfranchisement eﬀects, it follows that the nonproﬁt advocacy organizations
in the smaller more disenfranchised segments can more readily increase their turnout rates
and that, as a result, these segments beneﬁt the most from the resulting changes in the
equilibrium expected transfers.
Our results indicate that nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts have a meaningful impact on the policy
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choices of oﬃce-seeking parties, and — in addition to broadly encouraging civic engagement
— are an important political inﬂuence tool for nonproﬁt advocacy groups. The competition
between nonproﬁt organizations through nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts is a heretofore unexplored
form of special interest politics in which the advocacy eﬀorts are constrained by the regula-
tions on nonproﬁt organizations. In spite of these constraints, our results are reminiscent of
issues that arise in the literature on the combination of lobbying or campaign contributions
and electoral competition (see, for example, Austen-Smith 1987, Baron 1994, Besley and
Coate 2001, and Grossman and Helpman 1996, 2001). In this setting as in ours, special
interest groups simultaneously and non-cooperatively compete in order to inﬂuence the out-
come of the election and the resulting policies. However, in our setting this competition is
over voter turnout and the indirect eﬀect that this has, through the relative weights that
the political parties place on the segments, on the election and the resulting policies. Our
analysis, thus, extends the literature on special interest politics to allow for nonproﬁt ad-
vocacy groups who use targeted nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts and demonstrates the impact that
such eﬀorts have on policy outcomes.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the multistage model of redistributive
politics with targeted nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts. Section 3 characterizes the subgame perfect
equilibrium strategies in the model and examines the nature of the equilibrium transfers
by the parties and the equilibrium nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts by the nonproﬁt organizations.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
To examine how targeted nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts inﬂuence policy outcomes we utilize a
three-period model of redistributive politics. In the ﬁrst (or nonpartisan gotv) stage, each
nonproﬁt organization in each segment of the electorate simultaneously chooses a level of
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investment in targeted nonpartisan gotv eﬀort. Within each segment, the targeted nonpar-
tisan gotv eﬀorts increase the turnout rate in that segment. In the second (or campaign)
stage, the two political parties observe the segments’ updated turnout rates, and each party
simultaneously announces a transfer schedule. In the ﬁnal (or voting) stage, each voter in
each segment observes the proposed transfer from each party and votes for the party that
oﬀers the higher transfer (with ties broken by fair randomization).
The initial conditions of the game are given as follows. The electorate consists of a ﬁnite
number nc of citizens. Each citizen belongs to one of the ﬁnite number ns of identiﬁable and
disjoint segments indexed by j ∈ {1, . . . , ns}. The number of citizens in segment j is denoted
mj, so that
∑ns
j=1 mj = nc. The segments of citizens may be distinguished by characteristics,
such as race, gender, age, socioeconomic factors, geographic location, etc.
Citizens may either be voters or non-voters. Within each segment of citizens, a proportion
of the citizens abstains from voting in period three.7 While we abstract from the exact cause
of voter abstention, this may be thought of as arising from considerations such as costly
voting. Let v0j ∈ (0, 1) denote the initial proportion of the citizens in segment j who turn
out and vote in the election (henceforth, the turnout rate). Alternatively, 1−v0j is the initial
proportion of the citizens in segment j who abstain from voting (henceforth, the abstention
rate), and the initial number of non-voters in segment j is (1−v0j )mj. Observe that segment
j is distinguished by both its number of citizens mj and its initial turnout rate v
0
j . Moreover,
j’s share of the total voting population is mjv
0
j/
∑ns
h=1 mhv
0
h.
7In assuming a deterministic and ﬁnite number of voters in each segment we are ignoring integer problems
that arise when the turnout and abstention rates generate non-whole numbers of citizens who intend to vote
or abstain. This integer problem can be avoided without diﬃculty in a number of ways. First, one can
assume, when necessary, the existence of a marginal citizen in the segment that is endowed with a fractional
vote rather than a full vote Alternatively, one can assume that the actual number of citizens voting within a
segment is stochastic, but whole, but that the expected turnout and abstention rates generate mathematical
expectations that are potentially non-whole. Finally, we can assume the number of citizens in each segment
is large and that our continuous treatment is viewed as an arbitrarily close approximation. In fact, our
analysis would not be altered substantially if we assumed that each of the ﬁnite number of segments contains
a continuum of citizens.
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Let the three-stage game with segment sizes m = (m1, . . . ,mns) and initial turnout rates
v0 = (v01, . . . , v
0
ns) be denoted Γ(m,v
0). We start the description of the model in the ﬁnal
stage.
Voting Stage
Suppose that as a result of nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts in the ﬁrst stage the voter turnout
rate in each of the segments in the ﬁnal voting stage is updated from v0 = (v01, . . . , v
0
ns) to
v = (v1, . . . , vns). Moreover, let ti,j denote the transfer promised to each citizen in segment
j by party i ∈ {A,B} in the second stage of the game. We assume that all citizens prefer
higher to lower transfers and in the ﬁnal stage each citizen that is a voter votes for the party
that provides the higher transfer (with ties broken by fair randomization). Hence, if party i
provides a strictly higher transfer to segment j than its rival party, it earns the votes of the
mjvj voters in that segment, with mj(1− vj) citizens abstaining from voting.
Campaign Stage
The second stage consists of a redistributive politics model which extends Laslier (2002)
and Laslier and Picard (2002) to allow for voter abstention. At the start of period two, the
two expected vote-share maximizing political parties, denoted by i ∈ {A,B}, observe the
segments’ updated turnout rates v = (v1, . . . , vns) and make binding promises as to how
they would allocate a ﬁxed budget across the electorate. The ﬁxed budget is normalized to
one unit of the homogeneous good. The parties may target campaign promises of diﬀerent
transfers to diﬀerent segments, but within each segment of citizens, each citizen receives the
same transfer. We assume that ti,j, the transfer promised to each citizen in segment j by
party i, must be nonnegative. For each party, the set of feasible ns-tuples of transfers across
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the ns segments of the electorate is denoted by
T =
{
t ∈ Rns+
∣∣∣∣
ns∑
j=1
mjtj = 1
}
.
As in Laslier (2002), if a single segment of the electorate contains a majority of the voters,
then the unique equilibrium is in pure strategies, in which both of the parties oﬀer the entire
budget to the segment with the majority of voters. If no single segment contains a majority
of voters, then there are no pure-strategy equilibria in the campaign stage. For each party
i ∈ {A,B} a mixed strategy, which we label a transfer schedule, is an ns-variate distribution
function Pi : R
ns
+ → [0, 1] with support, denoted Supp(Pi), contained in the set of feasible
transfers, T , and with the set of univariate marginal distribution functions {Fi,j}nsj=1, one
univariate marginal distribution function for each segment of the electorate. The ns-tuple of
party i’s transfer of resources across the ns segments is a random ns-tuple drawn from the
ns-variate distribution Pi. Recall that the elements of this random ns-tuple represent the
transfer promised to each citizen in segment j by party i, for j = 1, . . . , ns.
In order to rule out the possibility that the game is initially or becomes degenerate, we
assume that no single segment is too large in the sense that if all of the segment’s citizens
were to turn out and vote the segment would not contain a majority of the voters.
Assumption 1. For all j,
mj <
∑
j′ =j
mj′v
0
j′ .
A direct consequence of Assumption 1 is that neither before nor after the nonpartisan
gotv eﬀorts does a single segment contain a majority of the voters.
As is common in the literature on electoral competition, we assume that the implemented
policy is a probabilistic compromise of the parties’ oﬀered transfers, which takes on party
A’s ns-tuple of transfers with probability equal to party A’s vote share and takes on party
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B’s ns-tuple of transfers with probability equal to party B’s vote share. Let E(tj) denote
the expected transfer received by each citizen in segment j from the implemented policy
generated by the two parties’ transfer schedules.
Nonpartisan gotv Stage
In each segment j ∈ {1, . . . , ns}, there is a nonproﬁt advocacy organization, denoted by
NPj, which represents the segment’s interests. In the ﬁrst stage, each of the nonproﬁts
has the opportunity to make an investment in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts. The nonpartisan
gotv technology works as follows. The nonproﬁt organization in segment j chooses a target
rate xj ∈ [0, 1], which represents the proportion of initially non-voting citizens that, as
a result of the nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts, become voters. For example, nonpartisan gotv
eﬀorts may provide information about voter registration, the location of polling stations, or
other information which lowers the cost of voting, and, thereby, increase the turnout rate.
Alternatively, the nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts may serve to increase the value of the process
beneﬁts accruing from the expressive act of voting. In either case, if the nonproﬁt chooses
a target rate of xj for the nonpartisan gotv eﬀort, then the proportion of voting citizens
increases by (1 − v0j )xj. That is, the turnout rate changes from its initial value v0j to the
updated value vj(xj) as follows
vj(xj) ≡ v0j + (1− v0j )xj. (1)
After the nonpartisan gotv stage, segment j’s share of the voters is mjvj(xj)/
∑ns
h=1 mhvh(xh),
which relative to segment j’s initial share of the voters may either increase or decrease
depending upon the actions of the nonproﬁt organizations in the other ns − 1 segments.
Each nonproﬁt advocacy organization’s objective function is assumed to be linearly sep-
arable in the costs and beneﬁts of gotv eﬀort. By choosing a target rate of xj ∈ [0, 1] for the
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nonpartisan gotv eﬀort, the nonproﬁt organization incurs a cost of xjc(mj, v
0
j ), where the
constant marginal cost c(mj, v
0
j ) satisﬁes the following assumption.
Assumption 2. The constant marginal cost of nonpartisan gotv eﬀort is given by
c(mj, v
0
j ) = αmj(1− v0j )
where α is a constant that is greater than 1/(
∑ns
h=1 mhv
0
h)).
A constant marginal cost of the form given in Assumption 2 corresponds to a constant
unit cost per new voter equal to α. That is, increasing the number of voters in segment
j by mj(1 − v0j )xj entails a total cost of xjc(mj, v0j ) = αmj(1 − v0j )xj, and the resulting
constant unit cost per voter is (αmj(1− v0j )xj)/(mj(1− v0j )xj) = α. While this is a stylistic
assumption, this choice of cost structure is motivated as follows. Given the high level of
information that is available to nonproﬁt organizations and the high degree of targetability in
the standard gotv methods (direct mail, phone banks, door-to-door, etc), nonproﬁt advocacy
organizations have the ability to identify the non-voting citizens and to directly target their
nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts at the non-voters. It, therefore, seems reasonable to assume a
constant unit cost per new voter. However, our main results are qualitatively similar under
the assumption that gotv eﬀorts must be broadly targeted at the entire segment rather than
at just the non-voters.8 Assumption 2’s condition on the constant unit cost per new voter
α (α > 1/
∑ns
h=1 mhv
0
h) rules out the possibility that any nonproﬁt would optimally choose a
target rate that resulted in full participation (xj = 1).
Each of the nonproﬁt advocacy organizations is risk neutral and seeks to maximize the
8It is straightforward to extend Theorem 2 to allow for alternative cost speciﬁcations. Under the assump-
tion that the constant marginal cost depends on only the number of citizens (an assumption consistent with
either or both imperfect targeting and uncertainty over the identity of non-voters), a slightly stronger form
of Propositions 2 and 3 hold as long as the constant marginal cost function c(mj) is elastic with respect to
the number of citizens in the segment. Note that under Assumption 2 the constant marginal cost is unit
elastic with respect to the segment size and, hence, forms an endpoint of the set of the elastic marginal cost
functions with respect to segment size.
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total expected value of the transfers that its segment receives from the implemented policy
minus the opportunity cost of the funds invested in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts,
πNPj(xj, x−j) = mjE (tj|xj, x−j)− xjc
(
mj, v
0
j
)
, (2)
where E(tj|xj, x−j) is the expected transfer that each citizen in segment j expects to receive
conditional on the ns-tuple of nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts x. Given the normalized budget of
one unit of the homogenous good, the total value of the transfers that segment j receives
from the implemented policy mjE(tj|xj, x−j) is equivalent to, and will henceforth be referred
to as, segment j’s expected share of the budget.
3 Results
Since it is individually rational for each voter to vote for the party that oﬀers the higher
transfer (doing so increases the expected transfer from the implemented policy), we start our
analysis in the campaign stage and work our way back through the game tree. The second
stage equilibrium transfer schedules are provided in Theorem 1.
Campaign Stage
Theorem 1. Let v = (v1, . . . , vns) denote the turnout rates facing the two parties in a
subgame starting at the campaign stage of the game. A pair of transfer schedules (P ∗A, P
∗
B)
constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium pair of local strategies for the subgame starting at
v if and only if the following two conditions are satisﬁed: (1) Supp(P ∗i ) ⊂ T and (2) P ∗i
provides the corresponding unique set of univariate marginal distribution functions {F ∗i,j}nsj=1
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where ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , ns}
F ∗i,j (t) =
t
2vj/
Pns
h=1 vhmh
for t ∈
[
0,
2vjPns
h=1 vhmh
]
.
Moreover, such subgame perfect equilibrium local strategies exist and give an expected payoﬀ
to each party of 1/2 of the vote share.
Proof. The existence of a pair of ns-variate distribution functions which satisfy conditions
(1) and (2) of Theorem 1 is provided in the appendix. The proof of the uniqueness of the
equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distribution functions is also given in the appendix.
In the following proof we show that any pair of ns-variate distribution functions which
satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 1 form an equilibrium. It is suﬃcient to show
that the expected vote share to each party from any budget-balanced strategy is less than
or equal to 1/2, given that the opposition party uses a joint distribution with the univariate
marginals outlined above and that expends the budget with probability one.
First note that if the ns-tuple of initial turnout rates {v0j}nsj=1 satisﬁes Assumption 1 [i.e.
that mj <
∑
j′ =j v
0
j′mj′ for all j], then it is clear that vjmj <
∑
j′ =j vj′mj′ for all j, and so,
no segment contains a majority of the voters.
Suppose that party A plays an arbitrary budget-balanced mixed strategy P¯A with the
set of univariate marginals {F¯A,j}nsj=1. Note that since P¯A is budget-balanced, it follows
that Supp(P¯A) ⊂ T . Also observe that if party B follows an equilibrium strategy P ∗B that
satisﬁes condition (1) and has the unique set of univariate marginals {F ∗B,j}nsj=1 that satisfy
condition (2) outlined above, then Supp(P ∗B) is contained in the intersection of the ns-box∏ns
j=1[0, 2vj/(
∑ns
h=1 vhmh)] and the hyperplane T .
Party A’s expected payoﬀ, πA(·) is calculated as
πA
(
P¯A, P
∗
B
)
=
1∑ns
j=1 vjmj
ns∑
j=1
vjmj
(∫ ∞
0
F ∗B,j(t)dF¯A,j(t)
)
(3)
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In equation (3), the denominator of the ﬁrst expression,
∑ns
j=1 vjmj, denotes the number
of citizens that vote in the election. While each party maximizes their expected vote
share, some of the citizens do not vote in the election, and this subset of citizens is not
included in the vote share calculations. In the second term in equation (3), the expression∑ns
j=1 vjmj(
∫∞
0
F ∗B,j(t)dF¯A,j(t)), denotes the expected number of voters to whom party A
provides a higher transfer.
Since party B’s transfers, drawn from an equilibrium strategy P ∗B, are contained in the
ns-box
∏ns
j=1[0, 2vj/(
∑ns
h=1 vhmh)], it is clear that in any optimal strategy party A never
provides transfers outside this ns-box. Inserting the unique set of equilibrium univariate
marginals for party B, {F ∗B,j}nsj=1, into equation (3) and simplifying yields,
πA
(
P¯A, P
∗
B
)
=
1∑ns
j=1 vjmj
ns∑
j=1
vjmj
(∫ 2vjPns
h=1
vhmh
0
t
2vj/
∑ns
h=1 vhmh
dF¯A,j(t)
)
(4)
In any optimal strategy the budget is spent with probability one, and it follows that it is
spent in expectation as well, i.e.
∑ns
j=1 mj
∫∞
0
tdF¯A,j = 1. Thus, πA
(
P¯A, P
∗
B
) ≤ (1/2) since
Supp(P¯A) ⊂ T . If in addition Supp(P¯A) is contained in the set
∏ns
j=1[0, 2vj/(
∑ns
j=1 vjmj)],
then πA
(
P¯A, P
∗
B
)
= (1/2). This completes the proof that the expected vote share to each
party from any budget-balanced strategy is less than or equal to 1/2, given that the oppo-
sition party is using a joint distribution with the univariate marginals outlined above and
that expends the budget with probability one.
The key feature of both parties’ equilibrium transfer schedules, and hence, the imple-
mented policy, is that each segment’s expected share of the budget, mjE(tj), is identical to
its share of the voters mjvj(x
∗
j)/
∑ns
h=1 mhvh(x
∗
h). As stated in Proposition 1, this feature of
the equilibrium expected transfers implies that in each segment j, the expected share of the
budget is increasing in its turnout rate vj.
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Proposition 1. In each segment j, the expected share of the budget mjE(tj) is equal to the
share of voters mjvj(x
∗
j)/
∑ns
h=1 mhvh(x
∗
h) which is increasing in the turnout rate vj(x
∗
j).
Proposition 1 follows directly from the characterization of the equilibrium transfer sched-
ules given in Theorem 1. Note that since each segment’s share of the voters, and hence
expected budget share, is increasing in its turnout rate, each of the nonproﬁt advocacy or-
ganizations has incentive to engage in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts. However, in each segment,
the share of the voters is also decreasing in the turnout rates of each of the other segments.
In the next section we characterize the optimal nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts and examine the
resulting changes in the segments’ voter turnout rates and expected budget shares.
Nonpartisan gotv Stage
We now solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium local strategies in the nonpartisan
gotv stage. Recall that in each segment j, if the nonproﬁt advocacy organization chooses
a target rate of xj ∈ [0, 1] for the nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts, then the updated turnout rate
in segment j, given in equation (1), is vj(xj) = v
0
j + (1 − v0j )xj, and the nonproﬁt incurs a
cost of xjc(mj, v
0
j ). The nonproﬁt seeks to maximize its expected payoﬀ, given in equation
(2), by choosing a target rate for reducing voter abstention. Given the equilibrium expected
budget shares (see Proposition 1) the optimization problem for the nonproﬁt organization
in segment j may be written as
max
xj∈[0,1]
πNPj(xj, x−j) = max
xj∈[0,1]
mjvj(xj)∑ns
h=1 mhvh(xh)
− xjc(mj, v0j ). (5)
Theorem 2 establishes the existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium proﬁle of
local strategies in the nonpartisan gotv stage. Note that in the nonpartisan gotv stage, the
optimization problem in equation (5) is isomorphic to the optimization problem faced by
each contestant in an ns-player Tullock game (Tullock 1980). The proof given here extends
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the analysis of the multi-player Tullock game to allow for asymmetric head-start advantages
(i.e., the initial number of voters mjv
0
j in each segment j).
As we will show, some nonproﬁt organizations may choose not to engage in any nonpar-
tisan gotv eﬀorts. Without loss of generality, number the segments in nondecreasing order
with respect to the expression mjv
0
j : m1v
0
1 ≤ m2v02 ≤ . . . ≤ mnsv0ns . Let P denote the set
of indices of the segments in which the nonproﬁts participate in gotv eﬀorts (i.e., optimally
choose strictly positive targets x∗j > 0 for gotv eﬀorts), and let k
∗ ≤ ns denote the number
of segments in which nonproﬁts choose to participate in gotv eﬀorts. It will also be helpful
to deﬁne the expression Vk for k = 1, . . . , ns as follows,
Vk =
(
k − 1
)
+
[(
k − 1
)2
+ 4
(
αk
)(∑
j>k mjv
0
j
)]1/2
2
(
αk
) .
In the event that k = k∗, we will show that Vk∗ is equal to the equilibrium number of voters∑ns
j=1 mjvj(x
∗
j).
Theorem 2. In the nonpartisan gotv stage of the game with ns-tuples of initial turnout
rates v0 = (v01, . . . , v
0
ns) and segment sizes m = (m
0
1, . . . ,m
0
ns) that satisfy Assumption 1,
there exists a unique pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium given by
x∗j =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
mj(1−v0j )
[
Vk∗ − αV2k∗ −mjv0j
]
if j ≤ k∗
0 if j > k∗
where k∗ is the largest index k such that
V(k−1) − αV2(k−1) > mkv0k.
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The equilibrium number of voters is
ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j) = Vk∗ =
(
k∗ − 1
)
+
[(
k∗ − 1
)2
+ 4
(
αk∗
)(∑
j>k∗ mjv
0
j
)]1/2
2
(
αk∗
) .
Proof. Given the relationship between the nonpartisan gotv stage and the multi-player Tul-
lock game, the following characterization of equilibrium strategies builds upon the charac-
terization of the multi-player Tullock game by Hillman and Riley (1989), Stein (2002), and
Matros (2006).
First note that it is clear that
mj
mj +
∑
j′ =j mj′vj′(xj′)
− mjv
0
j
mjv0j +
∑
j′ =j mj′vj′(xj′)
<
mj
(
1− v0j
)
∑ns
h=1 mhv
0
h
(6)
for all j. Recall that each nonproﬁt can choose not to participate in nonpartisan gotv
eﬀorts and have a strictly positive payoﬀ. It follows from the nonproﬁt organization’s payoﬀ
function, given in equation (5), that for any (ns − 1)-tuple of gotv eﬀorts x−j ∈ [0, 1](ns−1)
the expected payoﬀ in each segment j from choosing xj = 1 is strictly less than the payoﬀ
from choosing xj = 0 if
mj
mj +
∑
j′ =j mj′vj′(xj′)
− c (mj, v0j ) < mjv0jmjv0j +∑j′ =j mj′vj′(xj′)
From Assumption 2, c(mj, v
0
j ) = αmj(1 − v0j ) > (mj(1 − v0j )/
∑ns
h=1 mhv
0
h). Combining this
with equation (6) it is clearly suboptimal for any nonproﬁt to set xj = 1, and, thus, the
relevant portion of the strategy space is x ∈ [0, 1)ns .
At an interior solution the ﬁrst-order condition for the nonproﬁt’s optimization problem
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(see equation 5) is
mj
(
1− v0j
)(∑
j′ =j mj′vj′(xj′)
)
(∑ns
h=1 mhvh(xh)
)2 − αmj(1− v0j) = 0 (7)
The second-order condition for this optimization problem is
−
2m2j
(
1− v0j
)2(∑
j′ =j mj′vj′(xj′)
)
(∑ns
h=1 mhvh(xh)
)3 < 0, (8)
and, thus, the objective function is strictly concave.
Given the strict concavity of the objective function, it is clearly suboptimal for the
nonproﬁt in segment j to set x∗j = 0 if there exists an x
∗
j > 0 which solves segment j’s
ﬁrst-order condition given in equation (7). For each of the k∗ participating nonproﬁts (i.e.,
j ∈ P), the ﬁrst-order condition in equation (7) provides the following necessary condition
for equilibrium,
mjvj(x
∗
j) =
( ns∑
h=1
mhvh(x
∗
h)
)
− α
( ns∑
h=1
mhvh(x
∗
h)
)2
. (9)
Observe that the right-hand side of equation (9) is the same for all j ∈ P, and recall from
equation (1) that mjvj(xj) = mjv
0
j + mj(1 − v0j )xj. It, therefore, follows from equation (9)
that for each j ∈ P the increase in the number of voters mj(1− v0j )x∗j is strictly decreasing
with respect to mjv
0
j , and thus for j ∈ P, m1(1− v01)x∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ mk∗(1− v0k∗)x∗k∗ > 0, where
k∗ is the number of participating nonproﬁt organizations. The ns − k∗ non-participating
nonproﬁts (i.e., j /∈ P) are characterized by j > k∗, x∗j = 0, and mjvj(0) = mjv0j .
Summing across all segments
ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j) = k
∗
( ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j)
)
− αk∗
( ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j)
)2
+
(∑
j>k∗
mjv
0
j
)
, (10)
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Recalling the deﬁnition of the expression Vk, rearranging equation (10) provides the equilib-
rium number of voters
∑ns
j=1 mjvj(x
∗
j),
ns∑
j=1
mjvj(x
∗
j) = Vk∗ =
(
k∗ − 1
)
+
[(
k∗ − 1
)2
+ 4
(
αk∗
)(∑
j>k∗ mjv
0
j
)]1/2
2
(
αk∗
) (11)
Recall from equation (1) that mjvj(xj) = mjv
0
j +mj(1− v0j )xj. It follows from equations
(9) and (11) that the equilibrium nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts are given by:
x∗j =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
mj(1−v0j )
[
Vk∗ − αV2k∗ −mjv0j
]
if j ≤ k∗
0 if j > k∗
(12)
To determine which nonproﬁt organizations choose to participate in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts
recall that the index k∗ is such that m1(1− v01)x∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ mk∗(1− v0k∗)x∗k∗ > 0, and x∗j = 0,
for j > k∗. From the ﬁrst-order condition given in equation (7), the number of nonproﬁt
organizations that participate in nonpartisan gotv eﬀort k∗ is the largest index k such that
V(k−1) − αV2(k−1) > mkv0k (13)
where V(k−1) is deﬁned as follows
V(k−1) =
(
k − 2
)
+
[(
k − 2
)2
+ 4α
(
k − 1
)(∑
j>(k−1) mjv
0
j
)]1/2
2α
(
k − 1
) . (14)
This completes the proof of existence. The proof of uniqueness follows along the lines of
Matros (2006).
Before turning to the formal summary of the nature of the unique equilibrium of the
nonpartisan gotv stage (stated in Propositions 2 and 3 below), it is helpful to examine
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a simple example which illuminates the main features. Consider an electorate with 100
citizens divided among 4 segments. The cost of nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts is assumed to be
xjc(mj, v
0
j ) = xj(0.013)mj(1− v0j ). For each segment, Table 1 below provides the number of
citizens, the initial voter turnout rate, the unique equilibrium nonpartisan gotv eﬀort, the
expected share of the budget, and the initial share of the voters. The segments are arranged
in ascending order with respect to the number of citizens, with segment 1 having 20 citizens,
segments 2 and 3 having 25 citizens, and segment 3 having 30 citizens. The initial voter
turnout rate is 0.5 in segments 1 and 2 and 0.575 in segments 3 and 4. The number of citizens
and the initial voter turnout rates are given in columns 2 and 3, respectively, of Table 1.
Segment mj v
0
j x
∗
j vj(x
∗
j) mjE(tj|x∗j , x∗−j)
mjv
0
jPns
j=1 mjv
0
j
1 20 0.500 0.34 0.686 0.232 0.185
2 25 0.500 0.07 0.549 0.232 0.231
3 25 0.575 0 0.575 0.243 0.266
4 30 0.575 0 0.575 0.292 0.318
Table 1: Example
Not all of the segments engage in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts. From the fourth column
of Table 1 we see that in the unique equilibrium in the nonpartisan gotv stage only the
nonproﬁts in segments 1 and 2 participate in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts (i.e., x∗j > 0 for
j = 1, 2). As the condition in Theorem 2 states, nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts only occur in those
segments in which the product of the size mj and the initial voter turnout rate v
0
j is below
a threshold. That is, equilibrium nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts only occur in segments that are
suﬃciently small and disenfranchised.
The ﬁfth column provides the updated voter turnout rates that the political parties
use in the campaign stage. Note that the initial share of the voters (reported in the last
column of Table 1) provides us with what each segment’s expected share of the budget from
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the implemented policy would have been if there had not been a nonpartisan gotv stage.
Therefore, in comparing the last two columns of Table 1 we see how each segment’s expected
budget share changes as a result of the nonpartisan gotv stage. In this example, the change
in the voter turnout rate (see columns 3 and 5), as a result of the optimal nonpartisan gotv
eﬀorts, is increasing in the segment’s level of disenfranchisement (i.e., the ex ante abstention
rate) and is decreasing in the segment’s size. As a result of these changes in the voter turnout
rates the political parties place relatively higher weights on the smaller more disenfranchised
segments. Comparing the last two columns of Table 1, we see that among the segments in
which nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts arise (segments 1 and 2) the change in the expected budget
share is higher in the smaller segment (segment 1). As a result of the nonpartisan gotv stage,
the change in segment 1’s expected budget share is equal to .047 (.232 minus .185) while the
change in segment 2’s expected budget share is equal to .001 (.232 minus .231). Furthermore,
in each of the segments in which nonpartisian gotv eﬀorts do not arise (segments 3 and 4),
the expected budget shares decrease.
As formally stated in Propositions 2 and 3, among those segments of the electorate that
engage in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts each segment’s increase in the voter turnout rate and the
resulting change in the expected budget share are both strictly decreasing with respect to
the number of citizens in the segment and the initial voter turnout rate in the segment.
Proposition 2. In each of the segments in which the nonproﬁt organizations participate in
nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts (i.e., each j ∈ P or equivalently j ≤ k∗), the equilibrium increase in
segment j’s voter turnout rate, as a result of the nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts, is strictly decreasing
with respect to both segment j’s number of citizens mj and the initial voter turnout rate v
0
j .
From the unique equilibrium target rates {x∗j}nsj=1 given in Theorem 2, it follows that for
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each segment j ∈ P the increase in segment j’s voter turnout rate is given by:
vj
(
x∗j
)− v0j = (1− v0j ) x∗j = Vk∗mj −
αV2k∗
mj
− v0j (15)
which is clearly decreasing with respect to both segment j’s number of citizens mj and the
initial voter turnout rate v0j . That is, the largest increases in the turnout rates occur in the
smallest and most disenfranchised segments.
Given the political parties’ optimal strategies in the campaign stage (see Theorem 1),
the equilibrium expected budget shares from the implemented policy are increasing with
respect to the voter turnout rates (Proposition 1). Thus, to the extent that nonpartisan
gotv eﬀorts change the expected turnout rates, nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts have an impact on
policy outcomes. As Proposition 2 states, among those segments in which nonpartisan gotv
eﬀorts arise, the increase in the voter turnout rate is decreasing with respect to the number
of citizens and the initial voter turnout rate. Combining the results from Propositions 1 and
2, we see that among those segments in which nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts arise the change in
the expected budget share is also decreasing with respect to the number of citizens and the
initial voter turnout rate.
Proposition 3. In each of the segments in which the nonproﬁt organizations participate in
nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts (i.e., each j ∈ P or equivalently j ≤ k∗), the change in segment
j’s equilibrium expected share of the budget from the implemented policy, as a result of the
nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts, is strictly decreasing with respect to both segment j’s number of
citizens mj and the initial voter turnout rate v
0
j .
In each of the segments in which the nonproﬁt organizations do not participate in non-
partisan gotv eﬀorts (i.e., each j /∈ P or equivalently j > k∗), the equilibrium expected budget
share from the implemented policy decreases as a result of the nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts in the
other segments.
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Given the unique equilibrium expected budget shares, derived in Proposition 1, it follows
that for each segment j ∈ P the change in segment j’s expected budget share ∆mjE(tj|x∗)
as a result of the gotv activities of nonproﬁts is
∆mjE (tj|x∗) =
mjvj(x
∗
j)∑ns
h=1 mhvh(x
∗
h)
− mjv
0
j∑ns
h=1 mhv
0
h
(16)
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 3, then, follows from the equilibrium target rates given in
Theorem 2. In particular,
mjvj(x
∗
j)∑ns
h=1 mhvh(x
∗
h)
= 1− αVK , (17)
and, thus, from (16) the change in the expected budget share ∆mjE(tj|x∗) is decreasing
with respect to both segment j’s number of citizens mj and initial voter turnout rate v
0
j .
For the second part of Proposition 3, note that for each j /∈ P the change in segment j’s
expected budget share ∆mjE(tj|x∗) as a result of the gotv activities of nonproﬁts is
∆mjE (tj|x∗) =
mjv
0
j∑ns
h=1 mhvh(x
∗
h)
− mjv
0
j∑ns
h=1 mhv
0
h
, (18)
which is strictly negative if any of the nonproﬁt organizations engage in nonpartisan gotv
eﬀorts.
It is also important to note that just because the nonproﬁt aﬃliated with a segment
participates in gotv eﬀorts, it is not necessarily the case that the segment’s change in the
expected budget share is positive. That is, it is possible that among the segments that
participate in gotv eﬀorts one or more of the larger and more engaged segments may have a
lower expected budget share. However, it is still optimal for the nonproﬁts in such segments
to engage in nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts since not doing so would result in even larger losses
from the nonpartisan gotv stage.
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4 Conclusion
This paper examines the eﬀects of nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts in a simple multistage game of re-
distributive politics with voter abstention. For each segment of the electorate in equilibrium
the expected transfers from both of the political parties, and hence from the implemented
policy, are increasing with respect to the segment’s voter turnout rate. In weighing the costs
and beneﬁts of nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts, only the nonproﬁt advocacy groups aﬃliated with
suﬃciently small and disenfranchised segments of the electorate engage in nonpartisan gotv
eﬀorts. In those segments in which the corresponding nonproﬁt engages in gotv eﬀorts, the
equilibrium increase in the voter turnout rate is decreasing in both the size of the segment
and in the initial turnout rate. As a result the smaller more disenfranchised segments gain
the most from nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts. These results on the nature and impact of nonpar-
tisan gotv eﬀorts illustrate that even though the political inﬂuence activities of nonproﬁt
advocacy organizations may be constrained, these activities inﬂuence policy outcomes and
are important tools for nonproﬁt advocacy organizations.
Appendix
This appendix establishes: (a) the existence of joint distributions which satisfy conditions (1)
and (2) of Theorem 1 (i.e., form an equilibrium in the campaign stage of the multistage game
of redistributive politics with targeted nonpartisan gotv eﬀorts), and (b) the uniqueness of
the equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distributions given in condition (2) of Theorem
1. The formal proof of the existence of strategies which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of
Theorem 1 follows lines drawn by Laslier (2002). In this appendix, we only show how the
subgame in the campaign stage is isomorphic to the game in that paper.
As mentioned in the description of the model, the subgame in the campaign stage extends
Laslier (2002) by allowing for voter abstention. In the case that in each segment the expected
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turnout rate (either initially or after the nonpartisan gotv stage) is 1, the two games are
equivalent.9 In the discussion that follows we show that the equilibria in these two games are
related even when the expected turnout rates are not all equal to 1. Recall that within each
segment, each party must promise the same transfer to each citizen. Thus, if the equilibrium
citizen-level randomization for segment j, given in Theorem 1, is
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , ns} F ∗i,j (t) = t2vj/Pnsh=1 vhmh for t ∈
[
0,
2vjPns
h=1 vhmh
]
,
then since there are mj citizens in segment j the segment-level randomization is given by
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , ns} F s∗i,j (t) = t2vjmj/Pnsh=1 vhmh for t ∈
[
0,
2vjmjPns
h=1 vhmh
]
, (19)
Letting mˆj ≡ mjvj(xj), the set of segment-level univariate marginal distributions functions
given in equation (19) is identical to that arising in Laslier (2002) and the joint distribution
construction given in Lemmas 4-7 of that paper applies directly. Therefore, each party has a
strategy that satisﬁes the restriction on the support given in condition (1) of Theorem 1 —
which implies directly that budget-balancing occurs with probability one — and that provides
the set of univariate marginal distribution functions stated in condition (2) of Theorem 1.
We now address the the uniqueness of the equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distri-
butions given in condition (2) of Theorem 1. The formal proof of this uniqueness follows
lines drawn by Roberson (2006). The uniqueness of the equilibrium univariate marginal
distributions in the campaign stage follow from the relationship between the subgame in
the campaign stage and Roberson (2006). In the discussion that follows we will focus on
the segment-level univariate marginal distributions functions given in equation (19). Recall
that mˆj ≡ mjvj(xj). Roberson (2006) examines both the symmetric and asymmetric Colonel
Blotto game with homogeneous battleﬁelds and provides a characterization of the equilibrium
9Note that in that paper the budget is set to Q, while in this paper the budget has been normalized to 1.
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sets of univariate marginal distributions for a range of parameter conﬁgurations. By focusing
on the segment-level univariate marginal distribution functions and setting mˆj ≡ mjvj(xj),
the subgame in the campaign stage is equivalent to a symmetric Colonel Blotto game with
heterogenous battleﬁelds (i.e., segments of the electorate). In the case of symmetric resources,
the proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distributions given
in Roberson (2006) extends directly to allow for heterogenous battleﬁelds.
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